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IN THE UTAH COURT OP APPEALS
P. H. INVESTMENT,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
Casje No.

vs.

870501-CA

CATHY OLIVER,
Defendant/Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDING
This Court has jurisdiction to decide this appeal
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(1) and §78-4-11. This is
an appeal from a decision by the Honorrable Robert C. Gibson of
the Fifth Circuit Court in an eviction case.
ISSUE PRESENTED
Whether Defendant is entitled to a rent rebate to
compensate her for Plaintiff's failure to comply with Salt Lake
City housing ordinances and Plaintiff's breach of its implied
warranty of habitability.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. §78-36-3 to 10; Salt Lake City Ordinances §5-11-1.
STATEMENT OF TH^ CASE
This is an unlawful detainer action by a landlord
against a tenant based upon non-paymeht of rent. The landlord's
complaint sought a writ of restitution and a judgment for rent
owed and damages based upon Utah Code Ann. §78-36-3 to 10.
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The case was tried to the Honorable Robert C. Gibson
who granted judgment to landlord against tenant in the sum of
$80.36 for rent from February 1, 1987, through February 9, 1987,
for treble damages in the sum of $630.00 from February 10, 1987,
through March 6, 1987, and for costs of court of $19.35, together
with an Order of Restitution of the premises. Tenant received an
offset of $200.00 against this judgment representing her deposit
(R. 54, T. 59). The court dismissed tenant's rent rebate counterclaim.
Testimony given by William Cupid, a Housing Officer
with Salt Lake City Building and Housing Services, indicated that
there were numerous violations of the Uniform Housing Code and
the Uniform Code for the Abatement of Dangerous Buildings,
including electrical violations, a hazardous narrow stairway
without handrails, holes in the walls, tilted and rotted floors,
boarded-up windows, and an illegally built shed with a collapsed
roof (T. 30-33).

Mr. Cupid further testified that the building

was substandard and dangerous (T. 33). Tenant argued that based
on the warranty of habitability no rent was due and owing and she
was entitled to a rent rebate because the condition of the house
did not meet the standards set by Salt Lake City Ordinances,
namely the Uniform Housing Code and the Uniform Code for the
Abatement of Dangerous Buildings, §5-11-1 (R. 5-6).
The Court gave three reasons for refusing any rent
offset to tenant:
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1.

The court should not interfere in the contractual
arrangement entered into by tenant and landlord.

2.

A tenant is not entitled to any rent offset for
landlord's breach of an implied warranty of
habitability because the Utah Supreme Court has
never delineated such a cause of action.

3.

Appellant waived any defense or cause of action
under a theory of warranty of habitability by
agreeing to rent the premises in their deteriorated condition (R. 4 7, T, 59).

The matter now comes before this court for determination of whether a warranty of habitability is implied in a rental
agreement,, and if the breach thereof constitutes a defense to an
unlawful detainer action and justifies a rent offset or rebate to
tenant.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The vast majority of states has adopted the implied
warranty of habitability and has allowed it as a defense in
unlawful detainer actions. This Court take the final step in
establishing this doctrine in Utah and award tenant a rent rebate
to compensate for landlord's breach of this warranty.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE WARRANTY OF HABITABILITY, ADOPTED IN MOST
STATES, SHOULD BE JUDICIALLY ADOPTED IN UTAH.
The trial court decided this case by simply looking at
the agreement between the parties and defendant's admitted
- 3-

failure to pay rent. The court gave no legal significance to the
testimony regarding the condition of the premises.

By refusing

to consider defendant's basis for non-payment, the court erred.
The court should have applied an equitable offset to the rent
based on a warranty of habitability, considered the analysis of
recent Utah Supreme Court eases regarding landlords1 obligations
and considered plaintifff s failure to live up to those obligations.
The basis for the lower court's opinion was apparently
application of the doctrine of caveat emptor which has been
universally rejected as no longer reflecting the realities
underlying the landlord/tenant relationship in modern society.
Instead, the majority of states has turned to the implied warranty of habitability in order to better reflect the relationship
between landlord and tenant in modern society.
A warranty of habitability has three elements. The
first is that the warranty exists by implication in all residential landlord/tenant agreements to the effect that the premises
are fit for its intended use -- human occupancy, which is frequently measured by compliance with housing and health codes.
The second element is that the warranty is mutually dependent
upon the tenant's covenant to pay rent.

The third is that the

breach of the warranty by the landlord justifies the tenant in
suspending the payment of rent.

In turn, the breach of warranty

is a defense to an action by a landlord for non-payment of rent.
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The existence of a warranty of habitability derives
historically from combining principles of property, contract, and
tort law, as developed below.

It prevails in a majority of

jurisdictions in this country today.
A.

The Historical Basis for Applying Caveat Emptor No
Longer Exists in Modern Society.
Courts adopting the implied warranty of habitability

inevitably begin with a discussion of the anachronism of the
caveat emptor doctrine in today's society.

The U. S. Court of

Appeals for the D. C. Circuit wrote in Javins v. First National
Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1074 (D.C. Cir. 1970),
Since, in traditional analysis, a lease was
the conveyance of an interest in land, courts
have usually utilized the special rules
governing real property transactions to
resolve controversies involving leases.
However, as the Supreme Court has noted in
another context, the body of private property
law ..., more than almost any other branch of
law, has been shaped by distinctions whose
validity is largely historical. (footnote
omitted). Courts have a duty to reappraise
old doctrines in the light of the facts and
values of contemporary life - particularly
old common law doctrines which the courts
themselves created and developed.
The history of the landlord's maintenance duties
returns us to the Norman Conquest, when the land was divided into
great estates ruled by lords.

With the advent of the landlord's

Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment by 1500 came the creation of a new

See Boyle, The Landlord's Warranty of Habitability;
Plea for Statutory Reform, 1984 Florida Bar J. 509.
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A

social institution - the landlord/tenant relationship.
duty of the landlord was a negative one:

The chief

"to keep his overseer

away from the premises while the tenant had the right to occupy
2
and farm the land."

This negative covenant of non-interference

changed to an affirmative duty in the 19th century with the
change of life occasioned by the Industrial Revolution.

In

Edwards v. Etherington, 171 Eng.Rep. 1016 (1825), the courts
introduced the concept of an affirmative duty to see to structural repairs of the leased premises. A series of cases expanded
3
this new concept.
The result was a continued development of an
inference of a warranty of habitability in the residential
landlord/tenant relationship until the Housing Act of 1925, which
provided statutorily for an implied warranty of habitability in
the lease of every residence in London, the rent for which did
not exceed forty pounds.
American courts, unfortunately, followed the common law
in England only up to the 18th century.

Although England pro-

gressed, the United States1 courts continued to insulate the
landlord from liability.

It was not until the 1970fs that courts

Id. at 509.
3
See Collins v. Barrow, 174 Eng. Rep. 38 (1831) (tenant
held justified in abandoning leased dwellings that suffered from
lack of proper drainage); Smith v. Marrable, 152 Eng. Rep. 693
(1843) ("in point of law every house must be taken to be let upon
the implied condition that there was nothing about it so noxious
as to render it uninhabitable.")
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were willing to look beyond the frozen doctrine of caveat emptor
associated with agrarian England.
Four factors influenced courts in shedding the old
baggage.

First, courts began to recognize the changed needs of

the modern urban dweller.

One of the first courts to recognize

the need for change, the Court of Appeals for the D. C. Circuit,
noted that ff[w]hen American city dwellers ...seek 'shelter'
today, they seek a well known package bf goods and services - a
package which includes ...adequate heat, light and ventilation,
serviceable plumbing facilities, securp windows and doors, proper
sanitation, and proper maintenance."

Javins, 428 F.2d at 1074.

This emphasis on services makes the doctrine of caveat emptor
unconvincing.
Second, the lack of adequate1 housing has caused unequal
bargaining positions, leaving tenants With little leverage to
enforce a request for improved housing conditions.

"In reality,

the tenant is placed in a ' take-it-or-tleave-it' position which
forces him to sign a form lease providing him with no protection
4
and allowing the landlord to reap the benefits of the bargain."
Third, the agrarian doctrine assumed the equal footing
of the landlord and the tenant.
land.

Each had equal knowledge of the

In modern society, it is the lahdlord who has the superior

knowledge and financial capability wit)i regard to the condition

Note, The Implied Warranty of Habitability:
Deferred, 48 UMKC L.Rev. 237, 240 (1980).
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A Dream

and repair of the leased premises.

The Florida Supreme Court

noted that "we now live in an age where the complexities of
housing construction place the landlord in a much better position
to guard against dangerous conditions." Mansur v. Eubanks, 401
So.2d 1328, 1330 (Fla. 1981).
Fourth, courts have analogized the landlord/tenant
relationship to the sales contract theory of the Uniform Commercial Code. The Missouri appellate court observed that the
tenant's lack of knowledge of the true condition of the leased
premises rendered him just as vulnerable as if he had purchased
an automobile.

King v. Moorehead, 495 S.W.2d 65, 73 (Mo. App.

1973).
Modern courts, recognizing these factors, have abandoned the outmoded doctrine of law based on agrarian reality, and
have adopted implied warranties of habitability.
An oft-cited court, the Court of Appeals for the D. C.
Circuit in Javins, 428 F.2d at 1072-3, denied relief in a landlord's action for possession based on non-payment of rent on the
ground that a warranty of housing code compliance was implied by
law into all leases. This court noted its duty to "reappraise
old doctrines in the light of the facts and values of contemporary life," and concluded that "old rules of property law governing leases are inappropriate for today's transactions."
The Wisconsin Supreme Court in Pines v. Perssion, 14
Wis.2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409, 412-13 (1961) also pointedly remarked
that "[t]he need and social desirability of adequate housing for
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people in this era of rapid population, increases is too important
to be rebuffed by that obnoxious cliche, caveat emptor*

Permit-

ting landlords to rent 'tumbledown' houses is at least a contributing cause of such problems as urban blight, juvenile delinquency and high property taxes for conscientious landowners."
More recently, the Vermont Supreme Court in Helder v.
St. Peter, 478 A.2d 202, 207 (1984) asserted that "[i]n light of
these changes in the relationship between tenants and landlords,
it would be wrong for the law to continue to impose the doctrine
of caveat lessee on residential leases." And the Florida Supreme
Court, in an opinion construing a statutory imposition of the
warranty of habitability in Mansur v. [Eubanks, 401 So.2d at 1330,
stated that "[w]e do not believe there are sufficient reasons to
continue to completely insulate the landlord from liability."
Courts in twenty jurisdictions have echoed the statements of the courts cited above.
B.

This Court Should Follow the Lead of Hall v. Warren and
Declare An Implied Warranty pf Habitability in Utah.
The Utah Supreme Court has taken a major step in the

direction of an implied warranty of habitability in Utah. In
Hall v. Warren, 632 P.2d 848 (Utah 1981) (Hall I) and Hall v.
Warren, 692 P.2d 737 (Utah 1984) (Hall II), the Utah Supreme
Court addressed the issue of landlord liability for a tenant's
injuries due to a faulty furnace.

In gall, the tenants rented a

house in Vernal, Utah, under a month-"co-month oral agreement.
The house had a floor furnace that the plaintiffs did not use
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until three years later. When used, it produced gases that
asphyxiated the plaintiffs, requiring emergency medical treatment.

The tenants brought suit against the landlord alleging

negligence, breach of implied warranty of habitability, and
strict liability.

The court in Hall I reversed the award of

summary judgment in favor of defendants and remanded the case for
trial, holding that "a landlord may be subject to a duty of care
imposed by a statute or ordinance. Thus, pertinent safety
standards established by Vernal City's building code are considered as much a part of a lease as if expressly stated in the
contract."

Hall II at 738. The Supreme Court declined to decide

the case based on the theory of warranty of habitability due to
11

the abbreviated briefing of [this] issue." Hall I at 851.
The Hall I court based its decision on the fact that "a

landlord may be subject to a duty of care imposed by a statute or
ordinance."

Hall I at 850. This reasoning signals an acceptance

of the modern view that leases are to be treated as contracts
rather than land conveyances. Thus, the court held that
"[p]ertinent safety standards established by the Code are considered as much a part of a lease as if expressed in contract."

Id.

This is the same reasoning as is used by other courts that have
adopted an implied warranty of habitability in residential
5
leases.
And indeed, the Hall court cited Javins and Steele v.

5
See, e.g., Javins v. First National Realty Corp., 428 F.2d
(Footnote Continued)
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Latimer, warranty of habitability casejs, to support the statement
that housing code standards are incorporated into the lease.
Although the Supreme Court dfLd not address the issue of
an implied warranty of habitability in Hall I and II, it went a
long way towards acceptance of such a jioctrine by its recognition
that landlords do have obligations to tenants, and that, as other
courts who have adopted the implied warranty of habitability have
found, any applicable housing codes are made a part of the
leasing contract.

There is in Utah after Hall I and II, an

implied warranty of habitability in everything but name.

It is a

small step for this Court to establish an implied warranty of
habitability in all residential leases.
C.

The Majority of States Today Recognize an Implied
Warranty of Habitability, Either Statutorily or Judicially Imposed.
Appellant is not asking this Court to do anything that

is out of line with landlord/tenant lato in the United States
today.

It is Utah which is presently out of step with the

majority of states in its enunciation of landlord/tenant law.
At least forty-three states have adopted the implied
warranty of habitability, either statutorily, judicially, or

(Footnote Continued)
1071, 1081 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Glyco v. Schultz, 289 N.E.2d 919,
925 (Sylvania, Ohio Mun. Ct. 1972); Steele v. Latimer, 214 Kan.
329, 521 P.2d 304, 309-310 (1974).
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both.

Of these states, the judiciary initiated acceptance of

the doctrine in twenty jurisdictions.
Much of this activity by courts was premised on a
reevaluation of the court-made doctrine of caveat emptor.

As the

court stated in Foisy v. Wyman, 515 P.2d 160, 163 (Wash. 1973):
"Through the United States, the old rule of caveat emptor in the
leasing of premises has been undergoing judicial scrutiny."
(Emphasis added)

The California Supreme Court in Green v.

Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco, 111
Cal.Rptr. 704, 517 P.2d 1168 (1974) traced the origin of the
implied warranty of habitability to court decisions before the
turn of the century, such as Ingalls v. Hobbs, 156 Mass. 348, 31
N.E. 286 (1892), and explained its decision as "a logical development of the common law principles embodied in the Ingalls
decision.

517 P.2d at 1174 n.ll.

Finally the Green court

observed that it was following the lead of seven other state
supreme courts and numerous other courts in adopting the warranty
of habitability.

A few courts have rejected this analysis,

including Colorado.

The Colorado Supreme Court, in Blackwell v.

Del Bosco, 558 P.2d 563, 565 (Colo. 1976), stated that

See Appendix A for complete list of states which recognize
the doctrine of implied warranty of habitability.
7
See case citations in Appendix A for California, D. C ,
Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, Texas, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, and
Wisconsin.
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We have carefully considered the emerging
warranty remedy recognized i[n these [courts
declaring the existence of ah implied warranty] opinions. We have concluded that however
desirable the adoption of th^ rule of implied
warranty of habitability might be, the
resolution of this issue is pnore properly the
function of the General Assembly. The
implied warranty of habitability theory
involves many economic and social complexities, and we believe its adoption should be
preceded by the research and[study of which
the legislature is more capable. Embracing
the theory might, for examplp, cause landlords to significantly raise rents in order
to make the required repairs, or induce them
to abandon already run-down premises, leaving
some poor people without anvfplace, good or
bad, in which to live.
The Colorado court's decision to defer to the legislature is not
mandated by the facts, particularly now - twelve years later.
The research and study the court suggests has been completed and
g
documented in various studies.
The concerns of the Colorado
9
court, echoed by others opposing the warranty, are illusory.
The Heskin study, which surveyed California courts, for example
determined that

8
See, e.g., Ackerman, Regulating Slum Housing Markets on
Behalf of the Poor: Of Housing Codes, Housing Subsidies and
Income Redistribution Policy, 80 Yale |L.J. 1093 (1971); Heskin,
The Warranty of Habitability Debate: ^ California Case Study, 66
Calif.L.Rev. 37 (1978).
9
See Recent Developments, 1982 Utah L.Rev. 703, 708 for an
enunciation of the possible concerns. ("Increasing the
landlord's potential liabilities, however, may cause them to
abandon older, low-income properties, which are likely to violate
the codes. That result would diminish the supply of housing
available to groups that most need the protection afforded by the
codes.")
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1.

Green is being employed more often and
violations of the warranty occur less
often than assumed.

2.

The use of the warranty does not affect
the housing market.

3.

The warranty is leading to the repair of
property and could assist code enforcement if knowledge of it spreads.

4.

Tenants who remain in possession do not
have their rents substantially raised.

5.

Most tenants or their lawyers are not
inclined to abuse the law.

Heskin, The Warranty of Habitability Debate at 67.
Assuming that a court's concerns about inadequate data
are alleviated by studies such as the one above, a court might
still be concerned with speaking where the legislature has not
spoken.

However, in Utah, local governmental units have adopted

building, housing and health codes and thus broadened landlord
responsibilities.

This policy statement should embolden a

reluctant court considering an implied warranty of habitability.
The existence of a housing code has, in fact, been considered a
mandate by at least one court:
The legislature has made a policy judgment that it is socially (and politically) desirable to impose these duties on a property
owner - which has rendered the old common-law
rule obsolete. To follow the old rule of no
implied warranty of habitability in leases
would, in our opinion, be inconsistent with
the current legislative policy concerning
housing standards.

- 14 -

Pines v. Perssion/ 111 N.W.2d at 417,
This is also true in Utah, since Hall, where the Utah
Supreme Court defined the landlord's auty based on building
codes.

It is actually the Colorado court's dissent which is in

line with the majority of courts in this country.

The dissent

stated:
I do not believe that an outworn common law
doctrine should be retained in the law of
this state in the hope that the legislature
will act in that area. Had the legislature
acted in whatever way, I would, of course,
recognize and adhere to their power in that
area. But, in the absence of their action in
the field, I think it wrong to rely, as I
said on an outmoded common l&w doctrine. The
strength of the common law aXways was its
responsiveness to the changina needs of
society.
Blackwell, 558 P.2d at 566 (dissenting opinion).
This Court should follow the majority ^f jurisdictions declaring
the existence of an implied warranty o% habitability in residential leases and disregard those few, mostly rural southern
states, which, for reasons no longer relevant, decline to join
their more enlightened sister states iji the much needed progress
out of the agrarian age.

10
Accord, Teller v. McCoy, 253 S.E.2d 114, 122 (W.Va.
1978).

-
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POINT II
THE TENANTfS DUTY TO PAY RENT IS DEPENDENT
UPON THE LANDLORD'S PERFORMANCE OF HIS
IMPLIED WARRANTY OF HABITABILITY AND THE
LANDLORD'S BREACH OF THIS WARRANTY MAY BE
RAISED AS A DEFENSE TO AN UNLAWFUL DETAINER
ACTION BASED ON NON-PAYMENT OF RENT.
The modern view favors a new approach which recognizes
that a lease is essentially a contract between the landlord and
the tenant wherein the landlord promises to deliver and maintain
the premises in habitable condition and the tenant promises to
pay rent for such habitable premises. These promises constitute
interdependent and mutual considerations.

Thus, the tenant's

obligation to pay rent is predicated on the landlord's obligation
to deliver and maintain the premises in habitable condition.
The significance of this new framework for apportionment of landlord/tenant responsibilities and establishing dependent covenants is that all the remedies for breach of contract
are available to the tenant.

The failure of the landlord to

supply a habitable rental unit amounts to a failure of consideration thereby breaching the contract and justifying rent abatement.

The Massachusetts Supreme Court succinctly stated this in

Boston Housing Authority v. Hemingway, 293 N.E.2d 831, 843 (Mass.
1973) (footnotes omitted):
Since we hold that the tenant's covenant to
pay rent is dependent on the landlord's
implied warranty of habitability, there is no
need for a constructive eviction defense to
justify the tenant's decision to stop paying
rent. 'The doctrine of constructive eviction, as an admitted judicial fiction,...no
longer serves its [purpose] when the more
flexible concept of implied warranty of
- 16 -

habitability and fitness is legally available. f Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii 426, 434,
462 P.2d 470, 471 (1969).
Thus, instead of pleadihg constructive
eviction as a defense to a landlord's action
to recover rent, the tenant has recourse to
...contractual rights and remedies afforded
by the warranty of habitability.
Logically then, the tenant whose landlord fails to
maintain the premises in a habitable condition should be able to
rescind the contract without incurring liability for rent, deduct
the costs necessary to make the dwelling habitable (repair and
deduct), bring an action for damages (Retroactive rent abatement)
to be measured by the difference in value between the reasonable
rental value of the uninhabitable dwelling and the contractual
rental rate, bring an action for specific performance to compel
the landlord to provide that which was bargained for, or withhold
rent and raise the landlord's breach ih defense to an action for
summary dispossession.
The Javins court held that the landlord's duty to
comply with the housing code and the tenant's duty to pay rent
are mutually dependent.
Under contract principles...the tenant's
obligation to pay rent is dependent upon the
landlord's performance of hi£ obligations,
including his warranty to maintain the
premises in habitable condition. In order to
determine whether any rent i$ owed to the
landlord, the tenants must bfe given an opportunity to prove the housing Code violations
alleged as breach of the landlord's warranty.
Javins, 428 F.2d at 1082 (footnote omitted).

- 17 -

In Utah, the only remedies available to the tenant have
been constructive eviction and housing code enforcement by
municipal building inspectors•

But these remedies are inadequate

and impractical for several reasons.
The constructive eviction defense is an impractical
remedy in that it requires the tenant to vacate the premises.
This is a very burdensome requirement especially in today's
housing market.

The vacancy rate overall in low cost housing is

very low and low income persons are those most often subjected to
uninhabitable conditions.

Therefore, the tenant would most

likely find himself/herself in an equally dilapidated dwelling
upon moving.
Housing code enforcement is far from effective as the
Javins court noted.

The ineffectiveness of this method stems

from the court's unwillingness to recognize housing violations as
crimes and impose fines, and when they do, they are often minimal
and simply treated as a cost of doing business.

And if the

inspection results in a condemnation, the tenant is again subjected to the problem of finding another adequate and affordable
dwelling.

A presidential commission reported that inadequate

enforcement has led to
...thousands of landlords in disadvantaged
neighborhoods openly violating building codes
with impunity, thereby providing a constant
demonstration of flagrant discrimination by

Gribetz and Grad, Housing Code Enforcement;
and Remedies, 66 Colum. L. Rev. 1254, 1279 (1966).
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Sanctions

legal authorities,..[I]n most cities, few
building code violations are corrected, even
when tenants complain directly to municipal
building departments...[T]he open violation
of codes [acts] as a constant source of
distress to low-income tenants and creates
serious hazards to health aqd^safety in
disadvantaged neighborhoods.
The warranty of habitability defense goes to the very
essence of the dispute in an action fdr unlawful detainer for
non-payment of rent.

If the warranty is substantially breached,

the tenant's obligation is reduced.

When demand for the rent

owed is made, the amount of the demand is inaccurate and in
excess of the tenant's obligation.

Tl^e lack of effective reme-

dies for the tenant has no doubt led to the current situation of
large numbers of dilapidated dwellings and units in substantial
violation of the housing codes. For these reasons, this court
should recognize breach of the warranty of habitability as a
defense, partial or total, to an unlawful detainer action based
on non-payment of rent.
POINT III
THE LANDLORD MAY NOT ASSERT AN AFFIRMATIVE
DEFENSE OF ASSUMPTION OF RISK ON THE PART OF
THE TENANT TO DEFEAT LANDLORD'S LIABILITY
UNDER THE WARRANTY OF HABITABILITY DOCTRINE.
Most courts hold that the warranty of habitability is
applicable from the outset even when the tenant enters into the

Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil
Disorders, 472 (Bantam ed., 1968).
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lease agreement with knowledge of adverse conditions in the
dwelling.13 This result is only logical.
The Supreme Court of California in Knight v.
Hallsthammar, 171 Cal.Rptr. 707, 623 P.2d 268, 273 (1981),
addressed this issue directly:
...the fact that a tenant was or was not
aware of specific defects is not determinative of the duty of a landlord to maintain
premises which are habitable. The same
reasons which imply the existence of the
warranty of habitability - the ineguality of
bargaining power, the shortage of housing,
and the impracticability of imposing upon
tenants a duty of inspection - also compel
the conclusion that a tenant's lack of
knowledge of defects is not a prerequisite to
the landlord's breach of the warranty.
The opinion there also rejected, as inconsistent with Green, any
duty on the tenant to inspect for defects which may render the
premises uninhabitable and reversed a jury instruction which
barred the warranty defense for failure to inspect.
n. 5.

Id. at 273

Thus, the trial court's determination that any cause of

action under a theory of warranty of habitability was waived (T.
59) misstates the law and public policy and should be overturned.
CONCLUSION
Tenant sought a rebate of her rent based on landlord's
failure to comply with applicable building and housing codes.

See e.g. King v. Moorehead, 495 S.W.2d 65, 75 (Mo.App.
1973); Glyco v. Schultz, 289 N.E.2d 919, 925 (Sylvania Mun. Ct.
1972); Foisy v. Wyman, 515 P.2d 160, 164 (Wash. 1973); Boston
Housing Authority v. Hemingway, 293 N.E.2d 831, 843 (Mass. 1973).
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Uncontroverted evidence showed the existence of numerous code
violations.

These codes are a part of the lease between the

parties by operation of law. This coutt should articulate the
manner in which tenants can recover for landlordf s breach of
their implied warranty of habitability and provide guidance to
lower courts in considering this defense to non-payment in
eviction cases.
DATED this 14th day of March, 1988.
UTAH LpGAL SERVICES, INC.
Attorneys for Appellant

B^UCE PLENK
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this 14th day of March, 1988,
I mailed four true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief of
Appellant to James H. Deans, Attorney for Respondent, 175 South
Main, Suite 500, Salt Lake City, Utah

84111,

VJL
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APPENDIX A
STATES WHICH RECOGNIZE THE DOCTRINE OF
IMPLIED WARRANTY OF HABITABILITY
Judicially Adopted:
California:

District of
Columbia:

Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal.3d 616, 517
P.2d 1168 (1974); and Cal. Civ. Code, §§1941,
1942 (West 1974)
Javins v. First National Realty Corp., 428
F.2d 1071 (D. C. Cir.), cert, denied, 400
U.S. 925 (1970)

Georgia:

Gevens v. Gray, 126 Ga. App. 309, 190 S.E.2d
607 (1972); and Ga. Code Ann., §47-7-13
_1
(19
)

Hawaii:

Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Hawaii 426, 462 P.2d 470
(1969); and Haw. Rev. Stat., §521-42 (Supp.
1974)

Illinois:

Jack Spring, Inc. y. Little, 50 111.2d 351,
280 N.E.2d 208 (1972) (limited to existence
of municipal builqing code) Extended to all
leases regardless of codes by Glasoe v.
Trinkle, 479 N.E.2d 915 (111. 1985)

Indiana:

Old Town Development Co. v. Langford, 349
N.E.2d 744 (Ind.A^p. 1976)

Iowa:

Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791 (1972); and Iowa
Code Ann. §562 A ( West 1979)

Kansas:

Steele v. Latimer, 214 Kan. 329, 521 P.2d 304
(1974) codified in| Kan. Stat. Ann.
§58-2553(a) (1975)

Massachusetts:

Boston Housing Authority v. Hemingway, 363
Mass. 184, 293 N.E.2d 831 (1973); and Mass.
Gen. Laws Ann., ct^. 239, §8A (West Supp.
1974)

Michigan:

Rome v. Walker, 38 Mich. App. 458, 196 N.W.2d
850 (1972)Mich. Cotap. Laws Ann., §554.139
(West Supp. 1974)

Missouri:

King v. Moorehead, 495 S.W.2d 65 (Mo.Ct.App.
1973) [residential only]

New Hampshire:

Kline v. Burns, 111 N.H. 87, 276 A.2d 248
(1971)
A - 1

Kentucky:

Ky. Rev. Stat. §§383.5000 to 383.715 (1974)
(URLTA adopted)

Maine:

Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., tit. 14, §6021 (1980 and
Supp. 1983-1984)

Maryland:

Md. Real Prop. Code Ann., §8-211 (Cum. Supp.
1975), superceded in their respective jurisdictions by Baltimore City Public Local Laws,
§§9-9, 9-10, 9-14.1 (eff. July 1, 1971), and
Montgomery County Code, Fair Landlord-Tenant
Relations ch. 93A (Nov. 21, 1972)

Minnesota:

Minn. Stat. Ann., §504.18 (West 1971),
applied in Fritz v. Warthen, 298 Minn. 54,
213 N.W.2d 339 (1973)

Montana:

Mont. Code Ann., §§42-420 and 42-426 (1977)

Nebraska:

Neb. Rev. Stat., §§76-1419, 76-1425, et seq.
(Cum. Supp. 1974)

Nevada:

Nev. Rev. Stat., §118A.290 (1970)
(but note that the act does not protect
tenants whose landlord owns fewer than seven
units)

New Mexico:

N.M. Stat. Ann., §§70-7-1 (1975) and N.M.
Stat. Ann. §§47-8-1 to -51 (1978) (URLTA
adopted)

New York:

N.Y. Real Prop. Law, §§235-b (McKinney 1975)

North Carolina:

N.C. Gen. Stat. §42-42(a)(l) (1984)

North Dakota:

N.D. Cent. Code, §47-16-13.1 (1977)

Oklahoma:

Okla. Stat. Ann., tit. 41, §118 (West 1978)

Oregon:

Or. Rev. Stat., §§91.770, 91.800-.815 (1974)
(URLTA adopted); L & M Investment Co. v.
Morrison, 286 Or. 397, 594 P.2d 1238 (1979),
upholding and interpreting habitability
sections of statute.

Rhode Island:

R.I. Gen. Laws §§34-18-1 to -56 (1987) (URLTA
adopted)

South Carolina:

S.C. Code Ann. §27-40-440 (Law
Co-op.Cum.Supp. 1987)

A -3

New Jersey:

Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 265 A.2d 526
(1970)

Ohio:

Glyco v. Schultz, 35 Ohio Misc. 25, 289
N.E.2d 919 (Sylvania Mun.Ct. 1972); and Ohio
Rev. Code Ann. §§5321.04, 5321.07 (Page Supp.
1974)

Pennsylvania:

Pugh v. Holmes, 405 A.2d 897 (Pa. 1979);
[also Commonwealth v. Monumental Properties,
Inc., 329 A.2d 812 (Pa. 1974)]

Texas:

Kamarath v. Bennett, 568 S.W.2d 658 (Tex.
1978); and Tex. Prop. Code Ann. 92.052
(Vernon 1984)

Vermont:

Birkenhead v. Coombs, 465 A.2d 244 (Vt. 1983)

Washington:

Wash. Rev. Code Ann>; §59.18 (Supp. 1974)
requires tenant to be current in rent to
exercise remedies enacted after judicial
implication of warranty of habitability in
Foisy v. Wyman, 83 Wash.2d 22, 515 P.2d 160
(1973) (en banc)

West Virginia:

Teller v. McCoy, 253 S.E.2d 114 (W.Va. 1978);
and W.Va. Code §37-6-30 (1978) (sets out
landlord obligations but does not provide
remedy for breach)

Wisconsin:

Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis.2d 590, 111 N.W.2d
409 (1961); but see, Posnanski v. Hood, 46
Wis.2d 172, 174 N.W.2d 528 (1970).

Legislatively Adopted:
Alaska:

Alaska Stat., §§34.03.100, 34.03.160,
34.03.180 (1974)

Arizona:

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ahn., §§33-1324, 1361 (1974)

Connecticut:

Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann., §§47-24b (West 1960);
and LeClair v. Woodward, 6 Conn.Cir. 727, 316
A.2d 791 (1970)

Delaware:

Del. Code Ann., tit. 25, §5303 (1974)

Florida:

Fla. Stat. Ann., §§83.51, 83.56 (West 1973)
based on Mease v. Fox, Mansur v. Eubanks, 401
So.2d 1328 (Fla. 1981) construing the statute

Idaho:

Idaho Code, §6-320
A - 2

Tennessee:

Tenn. Code Ann., §§53-5501 (Cum. Supp. 1974)
(applies to major cities only)

Virginia:

Va. Code Ann., §§55-248.2 to -248.40 (Cum.
Supp. 1975) (URLTA adopted)

NOTE: URLTA, the Uniform Residential Landlord Tenant Act,
includes a warranty of habitability at Sections 2.14 and 4.105.
No Warranty of Habitability
Alabama
Arkansas
Colorado
Louisiana
Mississippi
South Dakota
Utah
Wyoming

A - 4
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Chapter 11
HOUSING
Sections:
5-11-1.
5-11-2.
5-11-3.
5-11-4.
5-11-5.
5-11-6.
5-11-7.
5-11-8.
5-11-9.

Uniform Housing Code and Uniform Code for the Abatement of
Dangerous Buildings adopted.
Governing body.
Housing inspection fees.
Housing Advisory and Appeals Board.
Conduct of hearing appeals.
Performance of abatement work.
Recovery of cost of repair or demolition.
Conditional permit for temporary securing.
Public nuisance and administrative review.

Sec. 5-11-1. Uniform Housing Code and Uniform Code for the Abatement
of Dangerous Buildings adopted. The Uniform Housing Code, 1982 edition,
hereinafter sometimes referred to 4s "UHC", and the Uniform Code for the
Abatement of Dangerous Buildings, 1982 edition, hereinafter sometimes
referred to as "UCADB", are hereby adopted by Salt Lake City as the
ordinances, rules, and regulations of said City, subject to the amendments and
exceptions thereto as hereinafter s^t out; three copies of said codes shall be
filed for use and examination by the public in the office of the City Recorder of
Salt Lake City. The purpose of these codes is to provide minimum
requirements for the protection of life, limb, health, property, safety, and
welfare of the general public and the owners and occupants of buildings within
Salt Lake City and providing for correction of violations thereof. Hereafter all
references in the revised ordinances of Salt Lake City, Utah 1965, to the
Uniform Housing Code and Uniform Code for the Abatement of Dangerous
Buildings, 1976 editions adopted by Section 5-11-1 are amended and deemed
to read the Uniform Housing Code, 1982 edition and Uniform Code for the
Abatement of Dangerous Buildings, 1982 edition.
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UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC.
Attorneys for Defendant
BY: BRUCE PLENK #2613
124 South 400 East, 4th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 328-8891
CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT

P. H. INVESTMENT,
Plaintiff,

*
*
*

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

*

vs.

*

CATHY OLIVER,

*
*
*

Defendant.

Civil No. 873-2236CV

*

The above-entitled action came on regularly for trial on the
5th day of March, 1987, the Honorable Robert C. Gibson presiding.
Plaintiff appeared by its agent Stan Secor and by counsel James
H. Deans. Defendant appeared in person and by counsel Bruce
Plenk of Utah Legal Services, Inc. The court having heard
arguments and testimony, considered the evidence and good cause
appearing, now enters its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
as follows:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The court has jurisdiction over the parties and subject

matter of this action.
2.

Plaintiff is the owner of real property located at 224

Iowa Street, Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County, Utah.
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3.

Plaintiff is the successor in interest to the rental

agreement entered into between Rainier Huck and defendant.
4.

Defendant rented the premises on or about November 1,

1986, and at that time the premises were in a dangerous and
deteriorated condition which was never repaired by Plaintiff's
initial landlord, Rainier Huck, or by Plaintiff.

Defendant

testified that the condition of the premises at the time of trial
was as bad as the condition on November 1, 1986.
5.

Defendant has failed to pay the monthly rental for

February, 1987.
6.

Defendant was served a 3-Day Notice to Pay Rent or

Vacate on or about February 6, 1987.
7.

Defendant is currently occupying the premises in

unlawful detainer.
8.

There is no document in evidence that would allow for

an award of attorney's fees to either party.
9.

Defendant called as a witness Mr. William Cupit, an

enforcement officer with nine years1 experience employed by the
Salt Lake City Building and Housing Services who testified that
he inspected the premises on February 19, 1987, and at that time
there were 42 violations of the Uniform Housing Code and the
Uniform Code for the Abatement of Dangerous Buildings, both of
which have been incorporated into the ordinances of Salt Lake
City.

Mr. Cupit testified that on the date of his inspection and

for a lengthy period of time before that day the building was
substandard and dangerous, a public nuisance and subject to
abatement by repair, rehabilitation or demolition.
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10.

Mr. Cupit testified that he would close the building to

occupancy if it were vacant and that he advised the Defendant to
attempt to relocate.

He further testified that on March 3, 1987,

he sent formal notice to Plaintiff to repair or demolish the
building.
11.

Defendant testified that when she rented the building

she was not aware of the extent and nature of the code violations
and that she could not afford other housing nor could she now
afford to move.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The court will not interfere in the contractual ar-

rangement entered into by defendant and plaintiff's assignor.
2.

Plaintiff is entitled to judgment against Defendant in

the sum of $80.36 for rent from February 1, 1987, through February 9, 1987, and for treble damages in the sum of $630.00 from
February 10, 1987, through March 6, 1987, and for costs of court
of $19.35, together with an Order of Restitution for the premises.

Defendant is to receive an offset of $200.00 against this

judgment representing her deposit.
3.

Defendant's counterclaim should be dismissed with

prejudice.
4.

Defendant is not entitled to any offset against rent

which she owes based on her defense of a breach of an implied
warranty of habitability by Plaintiff nor is she entitled to
recover any damages for Plaintiff's beach of an implied warranty
of habitability because the Supreme Court of this state has never
delineated such a defense or cause of action.
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5.

Defendant has waived any ddfense or cause of action

under a theory of warranty of habitai^ility by her agreeing to
rent the premises in their deteriorated condition.
DATED this

/T

day of / t Z ^ & ^ O

1987.

ROBERT C. GIBSON
CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW was mailed
first class to James H. Deans, Attorney for Plaintiff, 175
South Main, Suite 500, Salt Lake. City, Utah 84111.
DATED this

day of *Zu riZftdf-t*-*' . 1987.

bp/oliver.fin
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UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC.
Attorneys for Defendant
BY: BRUCE PLENK #2613
124 South 400 East, 4th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 328-8891
CIRCUIT COURT, Sxaxri OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT

*

P. H. INVESTMENT,

*
Plaintiff,

CORRECTED JUDGMENT

*
*

vs.
CATHY OLIVER,

*
Defendant.

Civil No. 873-2236CV

*

The above-entitled action came on regularly for trial the
5th day of March, 1987, the Honorable Robert C. Gibson presiding
and plaintiff appearing by its agent Stan Secor and by counsel
James H. Deans and defendant appearing in person and by counsel
Bruce Plenk and the court having entered its Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law and good cause appearing, now,
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT:
1.

Possession of the premises at 224 Iowa Street, Salt

Lake City, Salt Lake County, Utah, be delivered to the plaintiff,
and that the defendant and the defendant's property (and all
persons claiming a right to occupancy through defendant) be
removed from the premises.

All rights to occupancy through

defendant arising from the Rental Agreement are terminated, and

ADDENDUM
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the Sheriff or Constable is directed to execute this judgment
immediately.
2.

Plaintiff is entitled to judgment against Defendant in

the sum of $80.36 for rent from February 1, 1987, through February 9, 1987, and for treble damages in the sum of $630.00 from
February 10, 1987, through March 6, 1987, and for costs of court
of $19.35, together with an Order of Restitution for the premises.

Defendant is to receive an offset of $200.00 against this

judgment representing her deposit.

Plaintiff is thus awarded

judgment of $529.71.
3.

Defendant's Counterclaim is dismissed with prejudice.

DATED this

/6

day of

/ ^ ^ ^ ^ v 1987.

ROBERT C. GIBSON*-^
CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE

^^

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING\.
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing CORRECTED JUDGMENT was mailed first class to James H. Deans,
Attorney for Plaintiff, 175 South Main, Suite 500, Salt Lake
City, Utah 84111.
^

DATED this <P2>

bp/oliver.jud

day of L / C & ^ l /

. 1987.

